Master of One's Own Fate?

Though Boumediene was probably the biggest opinion released by the Court last week, one opinion that may have warranted more coverage was Indiana v Edwards. In an important variation on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court validated an Indiana judge’s decision that Ahmad Edwards, though competent to stand trial, was not competent to represent himself. Edwards was charged with attempted murder and other crimes following a 1999 incident in which he stole a pair of shoes and fired a weapon at a security guard. In 2000, based on a psychological examination, Edwards was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to a state hospital. In 2002 he was found competent to stand trial, but then a third examination in 2003 found him again to be incompetent. Finally, in 2005 Edwards was found competent to stand trial at which time he asked to represent himself. The trial court denied his request and insisted he accept the assistance of counsel. Edwards was convicted and appealed his denial of self representation. The appellate court agreed with Edwards and ordered a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court, looking to Faretta, agreed.

The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the trial court, holding that the constitution permits states to insist that an individual, though found competent to stand trial, accept representation where he is not competent to conduct their own trial. In short, the Court accepted the principle that an individual competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to represent himself.

The Court in Faretta read into the sixth amendment a defendant’s right to proceed at trial without counsel- a right to be the “master of one’s own fate.” Therefore, prior to the Edwards case, a defendant found competent to stand trial qualified to conduct his own trial without the assistance of counsel. In order to be considered competent to stand trial a defendant need only display an understanding of the nature of the proceedings against him, and an ability to consult with his lawyer and assist in his defense. (See Drope and Dusky.) This created a curious situation in which individuals, like Mr. Edwards, who straddle the border between competence and incompetence, ostensibly had the ability to choose to represent themselves in a court of law. This week, the Court tried to balance the defendants right to self representation with the government’s interest in securing a fair and speedy trial, by allowing judges the discretion to decide whether a defendant is competent to conduct their own trial. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, distinguished between the capacity necessary to simply enter a plea, as was guaranteed in Godinez, and the capacity necessary to conduct an entire trial pro se. Breyer hinted that judges must consider the potential fairness of a pro se trial and “the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial,”

Surely the Edwards case won’t impact a tremendous number of cases. Those individuals who wouldn’t reach the bar necessary to represent themselves would likely prefer to be represented by counsel. Nonetheless, the court makes a clear statement that the right to self representation is not absolute, and by giving deference to trial judges to make a determination of competency without providing a standard for judges to employ, the Court walks a tight line between judicial economy and a criminal defendant’s rights.

Indiana v. Edwards

Posted by Todd Garvey