Master of One's Own Fate?

Though Boumediene was probably the biggest opinion released by the Court last week, one opinion that may have warranted more coverage was Indiana v Edwards. In an important variation on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court validated an Indiana judge’s decision that Ahmad Edwards, though competent to stand trial, was not competent to represent himself. Edwards was charged with attempted murder and other crimes following a 1999 incident in which he stole a pair of shoes and fired a weapon at a security guard. In 2000, based on a psychological examination, Edwards was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to a state hospital. In 2002 he was found competent to stand trial, but then a third examination in 2003 found him again to be incompetent. Finally, in 2005 Edwards was found competent to stand trial at which time he asked to represent himself. The trial court denied his request and insisted he accept the assistance of counsel. Edwards was convicted and appealed his denial of self representation. The appellate court agreed with Edwards and ordered a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court, looking to Faretta, agreed.

The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the trial court, holding that the constitution permits states to insist that an individual, though found competent to stand trial, accept representation where he is not competent to conduct their own trial. In short, the Court accepted the principle that an individual competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to represent himself.

The Court in Faretta read into the sixth amendment a defendant’s right to proceed at trial without counsel- a right to be the “master of one’s own fate.” Therefore, prior to the Edwards case, a defendant found competent to stand trial qualified to conduct his own trial without the assistance of counsel. In order to be considered competent to stand trial a defendant need only display an understanding of the nature of the proceedings against him, and an ability to consult with his lawyer and assist in his defense. (See Drope and Dusky.) This created a curious situation in which individuals, like Mr. Edwards, who straddle the border between competence and incompetence, ostensibly had the ability to choose to represent themselves in a court of law. This week, the Court tried to balance the defendants right to self representation with the government’s interest in securing a fair and speedy trial, by allowing judges the discretion to decide whether a defendant is competent to conduct their own trial. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, distinguished between the capacity necessary to simply enter a plea, as was guaranteed in Godinez, and the capacity necessary to conduct an entire trial pro se. Breyer hinted that judges must consider the potential fairness of a pro se trial and “the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial,”

Surely the Edwards case won’t impact a tremendous number of cases. Those individuals who wouldn’t reach the bar necessary to represent themselves would likely prefer to be represented by counsel. Nonetheless, the court makes a clear statement that the right to self representation is not absolute, and by giving deference to trial judges to make a determination of competency without providing a standard for judges to employ, the Court walks a tight line between judicial economy and a criminal defendant’s rights.

Indiana v. Edwards

Posted by Todd Garvey

D.C. Institutes Neighborhood Roadblock to Curb Violent Crime

District of Columbia police initiated a new public safety measure this week in response to a surge of violence in the crime-ridden, Northeast D.C., Trinidad neighborhood. Police have set up road blocks on the main avenue into the neighborhood, stopping all drivers attempting to enter the area and turning away those that can not show a “legitimate purpose” for entering the neighborhood. Officers will stop all vehicles (pedestrians will not be stopped) and ask drivers for proof that they live in the neighborhood, or for visitors, their reason for entering the area. D.C police have described a “legitimate purpose” as a doctors appointment or a church visit. The roadblocks come on the heels of a violent weekend that saw eight killed. The area has already seen 22 homicides this year.

While these roadblocks are of questionable constitutional validity, they certainly highlight the intricate balancing of government and individual interests that accompanies any constitutional question. Clearly D.C. has a strong public safety interest in setting up these roadblocks. With violent crime rising and other less-controversial means not seeming to deter violence, the use of a roadblock could be considered a proportional response in light of the area’s safety concerns. Simultaneously, the roadblock is clearly infringing on the legitimate privacy and travel interests of residents looking to enter their neighborhood.

While the supreme Court has upheld the use of non-discretionary roadblocks in the past, the D.C. roadblocks raise two interesting issues. The first is the extent officer discretion plays in deciding who is granted, and who is refused, entrance into the neighborhood. The second relates to whether the city’s interest in combating violent crime, an interest unrelated to traffic or transportation concerns, justifies the establishment of a all stop roadblock.

The court is always skeptical of unconstrained officer discretion. While random officer stops lacking individual suspicion have been held to be unconstitutional (Delaware v Prouse), roadblock or checkpoint stops have been upheld where officer discretion in choosing who to stop is limited by department policy mandating that every car be stopped, or, for example, every 10^th car be stopped etc. While the roadblock policy here is to stop all vehicles, the officers seem to have been given broad discretion in determining whether individuals have a “legitimate purpose” for entering the neighborhood. They may have no discretion in who to stop, but with no reasonably articulable standard for who to let in, they exercise great discretion in the ultimate decision of admission. “Legitimate purpose” is by no means a substantively restrictive term. Unless the police department has provided officers with a list of what is a legitimate reason and what is not, officers are free to exercise their own discretion in deciding who gets in and who stays out. If individual officers are making these decisions on their own, unconstrained by department policy, the probability of discrimination increases and the validity of the roadblock decreases.

The Supreme Court has also held that roadblocks must be related to a legitimate law enforcement interest in traffic or road related safety. Under this rule, the Court has upheld stops related to stopping drunk drivers (Michigan v Sitz), while striking down roadblocks related to finding drugs (Indianapolis v Edmund). Here the D.C. police have specifically stated stopping violent crime as their reason for establishing the roadblock. The D.C. Attorney General has referenced an effort, upheld on court review, by NYC police to reduce drive by shootings by setting up these type of neighborhood roadblocks as legal precedent for the D.C. stop. But in the NYC roadblocks, a desire to reduce drive by shootings in an area was associated with a legitimate traffic related interest. A desire to reduce general violent crime in the area, as is the case in D.C., though an extremely compelling interest, is not related to traffic or road safety. If the D.C. roadblock is unrelated to traffic safety, it would seem to run astray of Supreme Court precedent.

The question remains whether a strong interest in public safety outweighs the constitutional concerns of potentially discretionary, non-traffic related roadblock. The checkpoints represent just another collision of safety and liberty.

Washington Post: Police Plan Vehicle Checkpoints

Posted by Todd Garvey